The Computational Divide: Indonesia’s BIM Adoption Gap and What It Means for Our Future

The global architecture, engineering, and construction (AEC) industry stands at a technological inflection point. Building Information Modeling – the digital representation of physical and functional characteristics of facilities – has transitioned from experimental methodology to industry standard in developed markets [1]. Singapore mandates BIM for all public projects exceeding 5,000 m² since 2015 [1], and the United Kingdom requires Level 2 BIM on government-funded projects since 2016 [2]. These mandates correlate with measurable productivity gains: studies document 15-20% reductions in project delivery time and 10-15% cost savings through clash detection and coordination improvements [3].

For a nation like Indonesia, standing at the crossroads of immense development and profound infrastructure challenges, the question is no longer if this paradigm will arrive, but whether our industry will shape its adoption or simply consume foreign expertise in the process [4]. To ignore this transformation is to risk being relegated to a consumer of digital tools rather than a leader in construction innovation. This is not merely about learning new software; it is about fundamentally rethinking the process of building design and delivery to address the unique complexities of our tropical context and the scale of development our nation requires [5].

Yet here lies the uncomfortable truth that nobody in power wants to discuss: Indonesia has the regulatory framework in place [6], but we lack the infrastructure to make it actually work [7].

Before we go further, let me be direct about something. You have probably heard that Indonesia has no BIM mandate [8], that our construction industry operates in a regulatory vacuum compared to Singapore or Malaysia [9]. That narrative is flatly incorrect. It persists because the people who should be communicating these policies are not, and because implementation failure looks so similar to policy absence that the distinction has become invisible.

Indonesia established clear BIM mandates years ago. Peraturan Menteri PUPR No. 22/PRT/M/2018, issued on September 14, 2018, explicitly requires Building Information Modeling for state building projects exceeding 2,000 m² floor area and more than two floors [6]. The regulation identifies BIM as the methodology for supporting planning and supervision effectiveness, emphasizing cross-disciplinary collaboration and data integration from project inception [10]. This applies to all non-simple state building construction, which in a country the size of Indonesia represents thousands of projects annually [5].

But that is only part of the picture. In August 2021, the Directorate General of Highways issued Surat Edaran Dirjen Bina Marga No. 11/SE/Db/2021 mandating BIM for roads, highways, toll roads, bridges, overpasses, viaducts, tunnels, and underpasses, including all complementary structures [11]. This directive provides detailed implementation guidelines covering organizational structure, budget allocation, minimum information requirements per project phase, and monitoring protocols [11]. The government has also implemented Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16/2021, which modernized building approval processes and established technical standard compliance frameworks that implicitly support BIM through digital documentation requirements [12].

So Indonesia has three major regulatory instruments requiring BIM implementation. The question, then, is not why we lack regulation. The question is why only 5% of professionals are formally trained in BIM [8], why 70% of people know what BIM is yet only 38% actually use it[8], and why the infrastructure to support these mandates remains fragmented rather than coordinated [7].

That is the real problem. And it is far more solvable than regulatory absence would be, because it means we have already made the policy decision. We just have not followed through on building the ecosystem to make policy meaningful.

Let me present a statistic that should trouble everyone in the construction industry: 70% of Indonesian construction professionals report awareness of BIM, yet only 38% actually implement it in their projects [8]. That is a 32-percentage-point gap between knowing something matters and actually doing it. This is not a knowledge problem. This is a structural problem [7].

In Malaysia, by contrast, the trajectory tells a different story [9]. In 2016, Malaysia had 17% adoption [13]. By 2019, after coordinated government intervention, that climbed to 49%—a 188% increase in just three years [14]. By 2021, Malaysia reached 55% adoption [15]. Malaysia did not accomplish this by issuing mandates and waiting. Malaysia did it through simultaneous intervention in three domains: training infrastructure, software accessibility, and regulatory enforcement [9]. They built the ladder before telling people to climb.

Indonesia issued its first mandate in 2018, nearly as early as Malaysia’s full policy commitment. Yet in 2021, when Malaysia reached 55% adoption, Indonesia remained at 38% [8]. We had the regulation earlier. We have fewer practitioners trained [7]. The gap reveals not a failure of policy but a failure of implementation – the decision to mandate was followed by insufficient investment in the conditions that make mandates meaningful [7].

When you mandate BIM but only 5% of your workforce has formal training [8], you are not accelerating adoption. You are creating frustration. You are forcing firms to hire foreign consultants or purchase expensive external expertise. You are, in effect, outsourcing your capability development to neighboring countries and international firms. This is exactly what we are doing right now.

The Cost Barrier: The Wall We Forgot to Acknowledge

Here is what the government regulation does not address, and what nobody in policy circles seems willing to confront: BIM software is economically prohibitive for most Indonesian practitioners [7], especially entry-level professionals and small-to-medium enterprises that comprise 95% of our construction sector [16].

Autodesk Revit, the industry standard architectural BIM platform, costs approximately $2,500 annually [17]. AutoCAD adds another $500. The full AEC Collection runs to $3,500 per year. For an entry-level architect or engineer earning approximately Rp 42-50 million annually (roughly $2,850-3,400) [18], this represents 70-90% of their annual salary. For the complete collection, we are talking about costs that exceed 100% of an entry salary [7]. Full ArchiCAD sits at roughly $2,200 – still 65-80% of entry salary. Even the “affordable” options like SketchUp Pro with extensions hit $1,200, or 35-42% of salary [17].

Now compare this to what other countries have done. Malaysia’s government implemented subsidies reducing effective software costs to 37-46% of entry salary [19]. Singapore’s BIM Fund covered up to 80% of software costs during the capacity-building phase in the early 2010s [1]. Indonesia has no systematic subsidy program. None. Zero. We have mandates with cost barriers that make compliance economically unreasonable for the professionals required to implement them.

This is not a hypothetical problem. This explains the awareness-implementation gap. Professionals understand BIM matters. They know it is coming. They simply cannot afford to invest in capabilities that their employers have not decided to fund. And employers – especially the SMEs that form the backbone of Indonesian construction – cannot justify $2,500-3,500 per seat when they operate on thin margins and see no enforcement incentive [16].

The cost problem compounds when you consider training. Comprehensive BIM competency requires approximately 180-260 hours of structured learning: 80-120 hours for software training, 40-60 hours for BIM management fundamentals, and 60-80 hours for discipline-specific workflows [20]. In Indonesia, this totals roughly Rp 21-37 million ($1,415-2,495) in direct training costs [7], representing 50-88% of an annual entry-level salary [18]. Malaysia’s subsidized training through CIDB reduces practitioner out-of-pocket costs to 20-30% of market rates [19]. Indonesia offers no equivalent.

When you combine the software barrier ($2,500-3,500) with the training barrier ($1,415-2,495), you are asking individuals to invest $4,000-6,000 from personal resources in a capability that their employers have not yet fully committed to purchasing. This is not a policy failure. This is an economic wall masquerading as a regulatory gap.

Why the Infrastructure Matters More Than the Mandate

Singapore’s BIM success is often attributed to their mandate, but that misses the real story [1]. Singapore’s 2015 mandate worked because it arrived after a decade of preparation. In 2010, the Building and Construction Authority established a BIM steering committee. In 2012, Singapore launched the BIM Fund  – a direct subsidy program supporting training and software adoption [1]. Only after this capacity-building phase was the mandate introduced in 2015, initially for projects exceeding $20,000 m², then gradually reduced to $5,000 m² [1]. This phased approach, combined with financial support and technical standards development, produced the 80%+ adoption rates Singapore achieved by 2020 [1].

Malaysia followed a parallel path [9]. National BIM Guidelines (NBIMS-MY) were established in 2015 [21]. The Construction Industry Transformation Programme (CITP) ran from 2016-2020 [14], explicitly focusing on training infrastructure development [19]. Only after this preparation phase did Malaysia announce its mandate for 2025 enforcement [15]. This sequencing was not accidental. It was deliberate policy design: build capacity first, enforce compliance second. This avoided the shock of mandatory adoption without practitioner readiness [9].

Indonesia reversed this sequence [22]. We issued the mandate in 2018 without first building the supporting infrastructure. The regulation exists, but the training ecosystem is fragmented, software costs remain prohibitive without subsidies, and enforcement mechanisms lack clarity [6][7]. We told people to climb a ladder before we finished constructing it.

The evidence of this implementation gap is stark in the statistics. Only 23% of Indonesian universities include BIM in core curriculum [23]. Sixty-two percent offer it as optional elective only. Fifteen percent provide no BIM exposure whatsoever [23]. Compare this to Malaysia’s National Higher Education Blueprint 2015-2025, which mandates BIM competency across all construction-related degree programs [21]. Indonesia has no equivalent requirement. We have no unified BIM certification framework comparable to Malaysia’s MyBIM certification or Singapore’s BCA Academy credentials [1][19]. We have fragmented private training providers with inconsistent quality standards and limited incentive for practitioners to invest in credentials when employers do not recognize their value [7].

This fragmentation produces the 5% formally trained problem [8]. In a survey of 40 Indonesian construction professionals, only 2 reported receiving formal BIM training [8]. Five percent. In a country with a construction sector exceeding $30 billion annually [16], we have trained fewer than 5% of practitioners in the methodology we mandated [8]. This is not a policy failure. This is the result of mandating without simultaneously investing in the conditions that make mandates effective.


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The Regional Context: What We Are Competing Against

Malaysia’s adoption trajectory is particularly important because it represents our closest competitor [24]. Malaysia is not ahead of Indonesia by accident or unique advantage. Malaysia is ahead because they made deliberate policy choices about sequencing: capacity building before enforcement [9], support systems alongside mandates [19], clear standards developed before compliance requirements [21].

By 2021, when Indonesia maintained 38% adoption, Malaysia had reached 55% [15]. The gap has continued to widen. Malaysia’s 2025 enforcement deadline will likely accelerate adoption further [15], while Indonesia’s ambiguous implementation timeline creates uncertainty about when compliance will be genuinely required. Firms planning long-term capability investment face a choice: invest now with unclear enforcement pressure, or wait and see. Waiting becomes the rational decision, which means adoption remains optional and voluntary rather than strategic and competitive [22].

Thailand and the Philippines offer cautionary tales in the opposite direction [25]. Thailand maintains approximately 30% adoption driven primarily by voluntary adoption for multinational projects [25]. The Philippines sits at roughly 20%, with adoption concentrated in firms serving foreign clients [25]. Neither country established government mandates. Neither built comprehensive support systems. The result is adoption that remains shallow, concentrated in elite firms, and disconnected from mainstream practice [25].

For Indonesia, the choice is becoming clearer. We can either build the supporting infrastructure that makes our mandates meaningful, or we can watch our regional neighbors advance while we maintain the appearance of policy without the substance of practice. The mandate exists. What is missing is the ecosystem to make it real.

The University Problem: Where It Should Start

One of the most fixable problems is also one of the most neglected: higher education [26]. Universities are where professionals acquire foundational competencies and where industry expectations become normative. If you graduate from a degree program without BIM exposure, you enter practice with a gap that expensive remedial training must later fill [20].

Only one in four Indonesian architecture and civil engineering programs include BIM in required coursework [23]. The rest treat it as optional or ignore it entirely. This is not because the faculty lack knowledge. It is because accreditation standards do not require it, because integrating BIM into curriculum requires faculty development that universities have not budgeted for, and because there is no enforced industry expectation creating demand for BIM-competent graduates [26].

Malaysia’s approach is different [21]. Their accreditation framework explicitly requires BIM competency. The result is that all graduates enter practice with baseline literacy. They may not be experts, but they are not starting from zero. This creates a virtuous cycle: employers can assume entry-level competency, so they invest in advanced training rather than foundational training [19]. Practitioners can market themselves on the basis of standard competency rather than specialized expertise [9].

Indonesia could implement this same mechanism immediately [26]. The architecture accreditation board (BAN-PT) could mandate that BIM represents a minimum 6 credit hours of study in all architecture degree programs by 2028. Civil engineering and construction management programs could receive the same requirement. This single policy change would transform the supply side of the training problem [23]. Every architect and engineer graduating in the 2030s would arrive in practice with BIM literacy, making adoption far less economically burdensome [26].

This costs the government nothing. It requires no budget allocation. It simply requires a decision that BIM competency is non-negotiable in construction-related degree programs. Yet it remains undone, which tells you something important about the gap between policy rhetoric and policy implementation in Indonesian infrastructure transformation [22].

What Actually Needs to Happen

Let us be clear about what solving this problem requires. It is not more regulation. We have enough regulation [6]. It is not more speeches about digital transformation. We have heard plenty of speeches. What is required is coordinated infrastructure investment in four specific domains [27].

First, we need an enforcement mechanism for existing mandates [28]. The Permen PUPR 22/2018 and SE Dirjen Bina Marga 11/2021 exist, but they lack teeth [6][11]. Unlike Singapore’s Building and Construction Authority, which audits BIM model submissions and rejects non-compliant applications [1], Indonesia lacks systematic verification [12]. Make compliance audits part of the building approval process. Require BIM model submission for projects covered by the mandate. Establish consequences for non-compliance – not punitive measures that cripple projects, but enforcement that makes the mandate real rather than rhetorical [28].

Second, we need to acknowledge and address the cost barrier through direct subsidy [27]. Launch an Indonesian BIM Fund modeled on Singapore’s and Malaysia’s success [1][19]: allocate Rp 50-75 billion annually ($3.4-5 million) to subsidize 70% of training and software costs for practitioners and SMEs [27]. Target 5,000-7,000 professionals annually for training support. This is not expensive by infrastructure standards. It is less than the cost overrun on a single major highway project. Yet it could transform adoption within three years [27].

Third, integrate BIM competency requirements into accreditation standards immediately [26]. Require all architecture, civil engineering, and construction management programs to include a minimum BIM module in core curriculum by 2028 [23]. Provide faculty development support to make implementation feasible [26]. This single policy transforms the supply side of the training problem at minimal cost [26].

Fourth, establish a unified BIM certification and standards framework [29]. Create Indonesia BIM Standards (IBIMS) adapted from existing frameworks but specific to our regulatory and technical context [6]. Develop a nationally recognized certification pathway – Level 1 fundamentals, Level 2 discipline-specific workflows, Level 3 BIM management [29]. Create institutional recognition for certification so employers understand the credential’s meaning [29]. This requires coordination among professional organization (IAI) and government agencies, but it can be accomplished within 18 months [29].

These are not dramatic changes. They are not revolutionary. They simply represent the implementation infrastructure that every country that successfully accelerated BIM adoption built before or simultaneously with their mandates [1][9][21]. Singapore did this in the 2010s [1]. Malaysia did this in 2015-2020 [9]. Indonesia is doing this in fragments without coordination, which means we are doing it inadequately [22].

The larger strategic question is whether Indonesia will become a producer or consumer of construction innovation [5]. If we build this infrastructure, we create a domestic industry capability that generates intellectual property, professional prestige, and competitive advantage [5]. We position Indonesian firms to lead regional projects rather than follow foreign expertise. We create economic value that stays in our country rather than flowing to international consultants [30].

If we do not, we have mandates without capability, policy without practice, and the appearance of transformation without its substance. We become the market for foreign BIM services rather than the provider [22].

The real barrier to implementation is not technical complexity or cost – both are eminently manageable. The barrier is political will [22]. It is easier to issue a regulation than to build the infrastructure supporting it. It is easier to talk about digital transformation than to fund it. It is easier to blame industry resistance than to acknowledge that industry is responding rationally to mandates without supporting systems [28].

This requires sustained bureaucratic commitment, cross-agency coordination, and budget allocation competing with other priorities. It requires technocrats at Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Education, professional organizations, and industry associations to align on a common approach and maintain focus for 3-5 years. This is not impossible [1][9]. Singapore, Malaysia, and dozens of other countries have demonstrated it is possible. But it requires intentional, sustained, politically supported effort [27].

Indonesia’s construction sector is one of the largest in Southeast Asia [16]. The infrastructure development requirements are immense – urban transportation, affordable housing, climate adaptation, disaster resilience [5]. BIM is not a luxury amenity [5]. It is a competitive necessity for managing the complexity and scale of development a developing nation with Indonesia’s geography and population requires [5]. Every year we defer building this capability, we increase the gap between what we are capable of and what we need to accomplish [24].

The mandate is there. It has been there since 2018 [6]. What is missing is the decision to make it real [22].

References

[1] Building & Construction Authority Singapore, “Singapore BIM Roadmap Report 2015-2020,” BCA Singapore, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.bca.gov.sg/bim

[2] UK Government, “Government Construction Strategy 2016-2020,” Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-construction-strategy-2016-2020

[3] McKinsey Global Institute, “Reinventing Construction: A Route to Higher Productivity,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/reinventing-construction-through-a-productivity-revolution

[4] World Economic Forum, “The Global Competitiveness Report 2020: How Countries Are Performing on the Road to Recovery,” 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2020

[5] Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023, United Nations, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/

[6] Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat, “Peraturan Menteri PUPR Nomor 22/PRT/M/2018 tentang Pembangunan Bangunan Gedung Negara,” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/159730/permen-pupr-no-22prtm2018-tahun-2018

[7] SMERU Research Institute, “Digital Skills Diagnostic: Indonesia’s Construction Sector,” 2023. [Online]. Available: https://smeru.or.id/en/publication/digital-skills-diagnostic-construction

[8] A. Firmansyah, S. Komalasari, and R. Wijaya, “Factors Affecting Building Information Modeling (BIM) Utilization Based on Stakeholder Perceptions in Indonesia,” International Journal of Advanced Science and Engineering Information Technology, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 543-550, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://ijaseit.insightsociety.org/index.php/ijaseit/article/download/18895/4233

[9] Construction Industry Development Board Malaysia, “BIM Adoption Study Report 2021,” CIDB Malaysia, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.cidb.gov.my/

[10] PT Buana Enjiniring Konsultan, “Regulasi Penggunaan BIM di Indonesia: Apa yang Harus Diketahui Pelaku Proyek,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://ptbek.co.id/id/regulasi-bim-di-indonesia/

[11] Directorate General of Highways Ministry of Public Works and Housing, “Surat Edaran Direktur Jenderal Bina Marga Nomor 11/SE/Db/2021 tentang Penerapan Building Information Modelling pada Perencanaan Teknis, Konstruksi dan Pemeliharaan Jalan dan Jembatan,” 2021. [Online]. Available: https://binamarga.pu.go.id/index.php/peraturan/detail/surat-edaran-direktur-jenderal-bina-marga-nomor-11sedb2021

[12] Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, “Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 16 Tahun 2021 tentang Peraturan Pelaksanaan Undang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 2002 tentang Bangunan Gedung,” 2021. [Online]. Available: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/161550/pp-no-16-tahun-2021

[13] Construction Industry Development Board Malaysia, “Malaysia BIM Report 2016,” CIDB Malaysia, 2016.

[14] Construction Industry Development Board Malaysia, “National BIM Survey 2019,” CIDB Malaysia, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.cidb.gov.my/bim-survey-2019

[15] Construction Industry Development Board Malaysia, “BIM Adoption Study Report 2021,” CIDB Malaysia, 2021.

[16] Badan Pusat Statistik, “Statistik Konstruksi Indonesia 2021,” BPS Indonesia, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2021/konstruksi-indonesia-2021.html

[17] Autodesk, “AEC Collection Pricing – Southeast Asia,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.autodesk.com/products/collections/architecture-engineering-construction/overview

[18] Badan Pusat Statistik, “Upah Minimum Regional Indonesia 2023,” BPS Indonesia, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://www.bps.go.id/

[19] Construction Industry Development Board Malaysia, “CIDB Training Subsidy Programme Annual Report,” CIDB Malaysia, 2020.

[20] C. Eastman, P. Teicholz, R. Sacks, and K. Liston, BIM Handbook: A Guide to Building Information Modeling for Owners, Managers, Designers, Engineers and Contractors, 3rd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018.

[21] Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia, “Malaysia Education Blueprint 2015-2025 (Higher Education),” 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.mohe.gov.my/en/download/public/penerbitan/pppm-2015-2025-pt

[22] H. Darmawan and B. Krisnamurti, “Implementasi BIM dalam Industri Konstruksi Indonesia: Tantangan dan Solusi,” Jurnal Rekayasa Sipil, Universitas Brawijaya, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 87-102, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://rekayasasipil.ub.ac.id/index.php/rs/article/view/737

[23] S. Nusiyati, R. Indrawan, and D. Putranto, “Initial Study on Building Information Modeling Adoption Urgency for Architecture Engineering and Construction Industry in Indonesia,” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Seminar on Building Integrity and Environmental Technology, MATEC Web of Conferences, vol. 195, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.matec-conferences.org/articles/matecconf/pdf/2018/06/matecconf_sibe2018_06002.pdf

[24] Ministry of Public Works and Housing, “BIM Policy Overview 2018-2023,” Jakarta, 2023.

[25] G. Ngowtanasawan, “A Causal Model of BIM Adoption in the Thai Architectural and Engineering Design Industry,” Procedia Engineering, vol. 180, pp. 793-803, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705817349827

[26] National Board for Professional Registration, “Higher Education Accreditation Standards for Architecture Programs,” 2024.

[27] Ministry of Public Works and Housing, “Proposed Indonesian BIM Implementation Framework,” Jakarta, 2026.

[28] Directorate General of Highways Ministry of Public Works and Housing, “Pedoman Implementasi Building Information Modelling (BIM) pada Lingkup Pekerjaan Konstruksi Jalan dan Jembatan,” 2023. [Online]. Available: https://binamarga.pu.go.id/uploads/files/1968/12PBM2023-Pedoman-Implementasi-BIM.pdf

[29] Indonesian Institute of Architects and Indonesian Engineers Association, “Indonesia BIM Standards Development Initiative,” 2026.

[30] Autodesk, “Global Study: The State of Designing and Making,” 2023. [Online]. Available: https://www.autodesk.com/products/design-think

My First Year Mapping the Intersection of Code and Climate

building structure transitioning from a digital parametric wireframe into a real-world bamboo pavilion

Consistency is often more difficult than intensity. It is easy to sprint; it is hard to walk every day for a year.

Today marks a small but meaningful milestone for me: I have successfully published a blog post every single month for the past 12 months. One year of consistent writing.

To some, this might seem trivial. It’s just a blog, right? But for me, this represents a discipline I’ve been trying to cultivate. In a world of instant updates and fleeting social media stories, the act of sitting down to write a thoughtful, long-form piece once a month feels like an act of resistance. It’s a commitment to deep thinking over quick scrolling.

When I started this commitment a year ago, I had a few hopes.

For Myself: Writing forces clarity. You think you understand a concept—like computational design or sustainable bamboo construction—until you try to explain it to someone else. Writing these posts has been my best method of study. It forces me to research deeper, structure my thoughts, and articulate my arguments.

For My Students: I wanted to create a resource that extends beyond the classroom. A lecture lasts 100 minutes, but a blog post lasts forever. Students can revisit these ideas about parametric design, environmental responsibility, or professional ethics whenever they need them.

For the Institution: I hope this blog contributes, in a small way, to the scientific culture of Universitas Medan Area. Academic discourse shouldn’t just happen in closed journals; it should be accessible, public, and engaging.

For the Public: Architecture can feel elitist or inaccessible. I try to write in a way that bridges the gap – making complex ideas about resilient cities or design technology understandable to anyone who cares about the built environment.

Looking back at the archive, I see a map of my own intellectual journey this year.

We explored computational design – demystifying Grasshopper not just as a tool for making weird shapes, but as a way to think algorithmically.

We dived into bamboo architecture, discussing how traditional materials can be optimized with modern technology.

We tackled climate resilience, especially after the floods of November. The post “Designing for Cyclones” wasn’t just an article; it was a response to a real crisis we all faced.

We reflected on education, asking hard questions about why hydrology isn’t foundational in design schools.

Each post was a snapshot of what I was learning, questioning, or fighting for at that moment.

I don’t know who reads every post. Analytics give numbers, but they don’t tell stories.

But then, something surprising happened in October.

Someone approached me on campus – someone I didn’t know – specifically to discuss bamboo. They weren’t a student in my class, but they had read my blog post about bamboo construction joints. They came with specific questions, ready to discuss preservation techniques and structural details.

I was genuinely surprised.

To be honest, sometimes writing a blog feels like shouting into the void. You press “publish” and wonder if anyone actually cares. But that conversation in October proved that words travel. It proved that there are people out there – students, practitioners, enthusiasts – who are hungry for this kind of specific, technical knowledge.

That moment was a turning point for me. It shifted my perspective from “I have to write this for my schedule” to “I get to write this for a community.”

It is the best kind of reward. Not the traffic numbers, but the real, human connection that starts with a shared idea.

I hope this blog serves as a small spark.
A spark for students to read more than just captions.
A spark for colleagues to share their own expertise publicly.
A spark for anyone to start writing their own thoughts.

Because knowledge that isn’t shared is knowledge that stagnates. Writing keeps it moving.

So, here is to consistency.

To showing up at the keyboard even when I’m tired.
To researching topics that challenge me.
To pressing “Publish” even when I’m not sure if it’s perfect.

Thank you to everyone who has read, shared, or discussed these posts over the last year. You are the reason I keep writing.

Let’s see what the next 12 months will teach us.

Keep reading. Keep writing. Keep learning.

When Architecture Becomes Disaster: Designing Flood-Resilient Cities

Floods Are Not Just Weather, Floods Are Design Choices

On 27 November 2025, Medan experienced massive flooding that inundated 19 of 21 districts in the city [1][2]. Water rose to knee-height, rooftops in Gang Pelita neighborhood were submerged, and major roads like Bhayangkara, Letda Sujono, Marelan Raya, and Brigjen Katamso were completely paralyzed [2][3]. The heavy rains that poured down Medan starting Wednesday night were triggered by Tropical Cyclone Senyar [1]. When media reported this Medan flooding, they focused on “extreme rainfall” caused by extensive weather systems. They said: “Heavy rain caused the Deli River and Babura River to overflow.” This framing makes flooding feel like an inevitable natural disaster.

But this is not the complete story.

Medan, Jakarta, Semarang – they all experience flooding with the same pattern. But if we look deeper, the more important question is: why is Medan’s flooding so severe that it paralyzes almost the entire city within hours? The answer is not just rainfall – the answer is urban design choices made over decades.

Every year, when the rainy season arrives, we see floods repeating. Homes are submerged, roads are congested, electricity goes out, hundreds of thousands of people are displaced, and lives are lost. In 2024, Indonesia experienced more than 2,100 natural disasters, and over 50 percent of them were floods [4]. These floods claimed 489 lives, caused more than 6 million people to be displaced, and destroyed tens of thousands of homes and public facilities [4].

I write this as an architecture lecturer at Universitas Medan Area who teaches students about structural design and construction every day. I see my students enthusiastically designing beautiful, innovative, and functional buildings. But they often forget one crucial thing: designing for disaster. They treat flooding as a problem that “engineers” or “disaster management” will handle – not as an architectural responsibility in the earliest design phases.

This is wrong. Architectural decisions about where to build, how to plan sites, which materials to choose, how drainage systems are integrated, and how much green space is retained – all of this determines whether buildings and areas become part of the flood problem, or part of the solution.

In this article, I want to take you on a journey from macro to micro scale – how city choices, site planning choices, and individual building decisions all contribute to the flooding phenomena we see today. More importantly, I want to show you that architects have the power to change this narrative. Every building you design can be part of the solution – not an amplifier of the problem.

Let’s begin by understanding what actually happens when floods strike our cities, starting from the closest one: Medan.

Part 1: Portrait of Floods in Indonesia – Medan, Jakarta, and Recurring Patterns

Medan: When Six Rivers Are Not Enough For One City

Figure 2. Urban Infrastructure Paralysis Due to River Overflow in Medan.

Medan should not be so vulnerable to flooding if it were managed well. Why? Because Medan has six major rivers flowing through the city: the Deli River (the largest, serving 51% of city area), Babura River, Sikambing River, Badera River, and several others [5][6]. With such a river network, theoretically, Medan should have tremendous natural capacity to handle rainwater.

But in reality? Medan is one of Indonesia’s most flood-prone cities. Between 2015 and 2024, Medan experienced 14 flooding events – averaging nearly 1.5 floods per year [5]. And the flooding that occurred on 27 November 2025 is not a “normal” flood – this is a flood that paralyzed almost the entire city, inundating 19 of 21 districts [1][2].

So what went wrong? The answer lies in three fundamental problems, all resulting from human design and development choices.

Problem One: River Narrowing And Sedimentation

Research from the Medan Integrated Flood Control Coordination Team shows that Deli River capacity has drastically decreased due to several factors [5]. First, sedimentation – accumulation of sludge and debris reducing river depth [6]. Second, illegal settlements along the Deli and Babura river channels that narrow the river [5]. Third, infrastructure development along the riparian area – roads, bridges, commercial buildings – all constraining water flow.

When I go and do a survey of the Deli River in the Medan Johor area, we could clearly see: residential buildings stand just meters from the river’s edge, sometimes with no space between house and water. These buildings not only reduce flow width but also limit the river’s ability to “breathe” when water rises. When river water rises, water cannot spread to adjacent areas – water can only overflow violently.

Plus, there is debris in the river. Lots of debris. Plastic, wood, construction materials – all of this gets trapped in the river and reduces flow capacity. When flooding occurred on 27 November, media reported that debris acted as a “dam” accelerating water overflow [2][3].

Problem Two: Loss Of Recharge Areas

Medan was built on low-lying terrain with previously very “wet” soil – marshes, seasonal flood plains, areas naturally functioning as water “sponges.” But over the past 50 years, all these areas have been converted [5].

I see this when teaching: my students whose homes are in peripheral Medan areas often mention that 15-20 years ago, behind their houses was a large marshland that would absorb rainfall and slowly channel it into the drainage system. Now? Everything is residential housing. Areas that once could absorb excess water now add to the water runoff volume into drainage, because 100% of the surface is now asphalt and concrete.

Currently, Medan has limited green open space – far below ideal standards for a healthy city [7]. Research shows that green open space in Medan continues to decrease due to residential and commercial development. When green area decreases, absorption capacity decreases, and when heavy rain falls, all water must “find a way” through an already-overloaded drainage system.

Problem Three: Under-Capacity And Poorly-Integrated Drainage Systems

Medan has a drainage system that is theoretically fairly large—but this system was designed based on assumptions about how much water would flow through it, and these assumptions proved wrong [5]. When the city develops faster than projected, when high-absorption areas are converted to low-absorption surfaces, the volume of water entering the drainage system far exceeds designed capacity.

Moreover, research shows there is “disintegration” between primary and secondary drainage systems [5]. Primary drainage—large channels connecting to rivers—does not optimally connect to secondary drainage—smaller channels from residential and commercial areas. As a result, when flooding occurs, water from secondary drainage cannot smoothly flow into primary drainage, causing backup and flooding in secondary areas.

When 27 November flooding occurred, many residential areas were inundated not just because rivers overflowed, but also because internal drainage systems were already saturated and could not accept more water [2].

Jakarta: A Multi-Layered Disaster Symphony

If Medan exemplifies how six rivers can become “insufficient,” Jakarta exemplifies how three simultaneous crises can create a perfect storm.

Jakarta faces three simultaneous crises: extreme rainfall, land subsidence, and loss of water absorption capacity [8][9]. These three factors create a situation where flooding is no longer an exception, but a yearly routine.

First, rainfall. In Jakarta, rain doesn’t just come – it arrives in spectacular quantities. During rainy season (November through March), the city can receive over 300 millimeters of water in a single day [8]. If you imagine every square meter of Jakarta receiving 300 liters of water in 24 hours, you can picture the total volume of water falling: billions of liters. Any drainage system, unless designed with very large capacity, will overload.

But in Jakarta, capacity is far below actual need due to two far more serious factors: land subsidence and loss of recharge zones.

Land subsidence in Jakarta is a frightening phenomenon. Northern Jakarta – including business centers and massive residential areas – has sunk an average of 2.5 cm per year. In some areas, subsidence reaches 25 cm per year [9][10]. Accumulated over decades, most of northern Jakarta is now below normal sea level. When heavy rain falls, water doesn’t just fall from the sky – water also enters already-submerged soil, creating nearly impossible-to-manage flooding.

The cause of this subsidence is excessive groundwater extraction. Over decades, millions of wells have been drilled in Jakarta for residential, industrial, and commercial purposes [9]. Groundwater is pumped out relentlessly, without adequate replenishment. As a result, formerly water-filled soil layers collapse, and the surface sinks.

The third factor – loss of recharge zones – is where architects and city planners are deeply involved. Jakarta once had many rivers, lakes, marshes, and open green areas [11]. All served as natural water “sponges.” But over the past 50 years, almost all these areas have been converted. Lakes were reclaimed for commercial use, marshes became residential developments, green areas were reduced for highways and parking lots, and everywhere, land was covered by asphalt, concrete, and roofs.

Result: almost nowhere left for rainwater to seep in.

Part 2: Macro Scale – When Cities Create Their Own Floods

Loss Of Living Surfaces In Medan And Indonesian Cities

To understand the flood crisis correctly, we must think about something fundamental: what happens to land surface when we build cities?

When you stand in newly-developed areas like Medan Johor or Medan Amplas, what do you see? You see a sea of asphalt, a sea of concrete, houses and shops packed together. Where is vegetation? Where is open soil? Rarely. Very rarely.

Now imagine standing in that same place 30 years ago. You would see much greener areas, with large trees, open spaces, marshes and small lakes. That land was “alive” – when rain fell, water could seep into soil, become groundwater, or flow slowly into surface water systems [12].

What happened over 30 years is massive transformation from “living surfaces” to “dead surfaces.” Dead surfaces don’t absorb water. No porosity. When rain falls on asphalt, water cannot enter asphalt – water must flow elsewhere. And since all surfaces are dead, water has only one direction: down, into drainage channels.

This is EVENT AMPLIFICATION. In natural conditions, when 100mm of rain falls on green and open areas, most water is absorbed, some flows slowly to rivers. Result: river flow increases gradually, and the system can handle it [12]. But when 100mm of rain falls on surfaces that are 90% asphalt and concrete (as now in Medan)? Almost all water must flow quickly into drainage. River flow rises drastically and rapidly. The system cannot handle it. Result: overflow.

SO EVERY DECISION TO CONVERT LIVING SURFACES TO DEAD SURFACES IS A DECISION THAT INCREASES FLOOD RISK [12][13].

Figure 4. Living Surface vs Dead Surface: Hydrological Impact of Urban Surface Transformation.

Architects, urban planners, and developers often make this decision for simple economic reasons: living surfaces generate less money than dead surfaces. One hectare of farm or park generates low economic value. One hectare of commercial or residential development generates billions in value. So the economic choice is obvious: convert everything to dead surfaces.

But this choice has a huge hidden cost: the cost of flooding [13]. When floods occur, economic losses, business disruption, property damage, recovery costs, social trauma – all vastly exceed economic gains from land conversion.

Figure 5. The Urbanization-Flood Cycle: A Three-Stage Transformation Model in Indonesian Cities.

Rivers: From Ecosystem To Drainage Channel

Focus is often placed on flooding in city streets, but the root problem lies in what happens to rivers.

In Medan, when I surveyed the Deli River, I saw a clear pattern: rivers that were once natural with many recharge and flood storage areas have been transformed into “efficient” channels – straightened, narrowed, and hardened with concrete [5][6]. Riparian areas that once had natural vegetation are now solid concrete. Areas that could absorb water during floods are now dominated by residential buildings.

When river water rises, water cannot spread to adjacent areas like in natural conditions – water can only move quickly downstream with high energy [5]. Water energy increases, speed increases, and when water reaches areas with lower capacity or encounters construction (like too-narrow bridges or narrowed channels), water overflows violently.

EVERY DECISION TO STRAIGHTEN, NARROW, OR “OPTIMIZE” RIVERS IS A DECISION THAT INCREASES FLOOD RISK [13].

Loss Of Recharge Landscape In Medan And Surroundings

Beyond rivers, there are areas that normally function as natural flood “buffers”: lakes, marshes, seasonal flood plains, green areas [14]. These areas gradually disappear due to development.

In Medan, research shows many areas that once functioned as catchment or recharge areas have been developed for residential and commercial use [5]. Research also shows that high-vegetation areas in the Deli watershed have decreased, meaning the area’s ability to absorb and slowly release water has also decreased [7].

In Deli Serdang (an area bordering Medan), flash floods occur regularly due to a combination of high upstream rainfall and loss of upstream vegetation that previously slowed water flow [15]. When heavy rain falls in upper Deli Serdang, water flows quickly downstream because there are no natural “barriers” like vegetation and flood storage areas to slow it down. Result: dangerous flash floods.

This is not accident or ignorance – this is the result of deliberate economic decisions to maximize land value through development.

Drainage Infrastructure Not Calibrated To Reality

When drainage systems are built, they are designed based on projections of how much water will flow through them. These projections are usually based on historical rainfall data and estimates of how much area will contribute to that drainage system [16].

But when cities develop faster than projected, or when high-absorption areas are converted to low-absorption areas, these projections become inaccurate. Drainage systems that were once adequate suddenly become under-capacity [5][16].

Research from the Medan Integrated Flood Control Coordination Team shows that Medan’s drainage system – while relatively large – cannot handle the volume of water generated by modern cities with high impermeability [5]. When 27 November flooding occurred, drainage systems overloaded across the city [2].

Adding new drainage capacity is not a simple solution, because city space is already very dense. A better solution is preventing water volume from becoming so large – by maintaining recharge areas, increasing surface permeability, reducing water runoff into drainage systems [16][17].

This is the responsibility of architects and city planners from the start.

Part 3: Meso Scale –  When Site Design Determines Fate

Site Design That Ignores Hydrology In Medan

When a developer buys land in Medan Johor or other developing Medan areas to build housing, the first decision made is: how many plots can I create from this land? This decision often does not consider hydrology at all [18].

The architect is then asked to draw a master plan placing as many plots as possible on the land, with roads, parking, and public areas minimal. The result is a site that is 85-95% covered by hard surfaces (asphalt, concrete, building roofs) and only 5-15% open area [18][19].

I often see this when surveying new housing in Medan: every square meter is maximized for buildings. There is no space for meaningful green areas. There is no thoughtful drainage. When heavy rain falls on such a site, what happens? Almost all this stormwater runoff must go to public drainage channels that are already full from other areas [18]. Drainage channels overload, and water finds alternatives—into housing areas.

When Medan flooding occurred, many housing developments built 5-10 years ago were inundated. Not just because rivers overflowed, but also because internal housing drainage was already saturated and could not accept more water [2][5].

DECISIONS ABOUT HOW MUCH GREEN AREA TO RETAIN, HOW MUCH SURFACE TO MAKE PERMEABLE, AND HOW INTERNAL DRAINAGE IS DESIGNED—ALL ARE ARCHITECT DECISIONS [18][20].

Green Infrastructure: From “Amenity” To “Necessity”

Figure 6. Green Infrastructure Typologies for Urban Stormwater Management.

In more advanced site design practice, green infrastructure is no longer just an element that “looks good for photos” – green infrastructure is an ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS [21].

Rain gardens are a simple but powerful example. A rain garden is a small open area with landscaping specifically designed to capture stormwater from surrounding areas [21]. Water enters the rain garden, seeps slowly into soil, and mostly doesn’t need to enter formal drainage systems.

Imagine if a 500-unit Medan residential development had rain gardens distributed throughout the area. Each rain garden handles 1-2% of total runoff. Multiply by number of rain gardens, and suddenly 50% of total runoff can be handled by green infrastructure, not entering formal drainage [21][22]. This is a huge difference.

Figure 7. Rain Garden Implementation for Distributed Stormwater Management.

Bioswales are a similar concept. A bioswale is a channel designed with vegetation, not just empty concrete [21]. Water flows through the bioswale, interacts with soil and vegetation, and mostly seeps into soil rather than flowing directly to rivers.

Permeable paving is another simple but very effective intervention [23]. Instead of parking lots made of solid asphalt, parking can be made with permeable materials – like paving blocks with gaps filled with sand, or special pavement that absorbs water. When rain falls on such parking, water seeps into soil rather than flowing to drainage.

Figure 8. Permeable Paving System: Transforming Parking Lots from Problem to Solution.

Retention ponds are larger interventions [22]. A retention pond is an area deliberately designed to hold excess water during heavy rain. In normal times, this pond can be a park, play area, or sports field. But when heavy rain occurs (like on 27 November), the pond can hold “extra” water, giving drainage systems time to handle incoming volume. Retention ponds break flood impact—from one large sudden impact to multiple smaller distributed impacts.

ALL THESE INTERVENTIONS REQUIRE CONSCIOUS DESIGN DECISIONS FROM ARCHITECTS [21][22][23].

Riparian Zone Management For Deli And Babura Rivers In Medan

Figure 9. Riparian Zone Restoration: Before-After Comparison of Urban River Management

When there is a river within or near an area to be developed, architects often see the river as a problem – unusable land that only “wastes” land value [24].

But a more advanced perspective sees the river as a POWERFUL ASSET FOR AREA DESIGN [24]. Good riparian zone management can create multiple benefits.

In Medan, there are initiatives to revitalize the Deli River using nature-based approaches, but implementation is still slow and not comprehensive [5][24]. If Deli River riparian management is done well – widening riparian areas, restoring natural vegetation, creating beautiful pedestrian paths, creating controlled flood storage areas – the results would be:

First, for flooding: rivers with wide riparian areas, vegetation, seasonal flood plains have far greater capacity to handle excess water [24][25]. When river water rises, water can spread into riparian areas, slowing speed, reducing energy, preventing the river from violently overflowing into residential areas.

Second, for ecology: healthy riparian areas are habitats for many species, maintaining river water quality, and preserving local biodiversity increasingly disappearing in Medan [24].

Third, for social and economic value: rivers with beautiful riparian areas, pedestrian paths, dense vegetation are community assets [24]. Rivers become recreation places, gathering places, places that improve quality of life – not just “places where flooding happens.”

Figure 10. Ecological and Hydrological Functions of Healthy Riparian Zones.

Decisions to widen Deli and Babura river riparian areas, restore vegetation, create beautiful pedestrian paths along rivers, create controlled flood storage areas – all are design decisions integrating multiple objectives: flood management, ecology, and social quality [24][25].

Part 4: Micro Scale – When A Single Building Can Make A Difference

Fatal Design Mistakes In Medan And Indonesia

There are several building design mistakes that keep repeating, with very negative impacts when floods occur [26].

The first mistake is PLACING VITAL SYSTEMS (electrical panels, generators, water pumps, water treatment, even public areas) IN BASEMENTS OR LOW GROUND FLOORS [26][27]. In Medan, when flooding occurs, many commercial and residential buildings lose power immediately because electrical panels are submerged in basements. When 27 November flooding occurred, many areas lost power not just because citywide electrical networks failed, but also because local systems in individual buildings were inaccessible because they were underwater [2][3].

A mall or hotel with electrical panels in a basement loses power immediately when flooding occurs, requiring weeks or even months to recover. A residential development with water systems in basement runs out of clean water immediately [26].

The second mistake is USING MATERIALS THAT CANNOT RESIST WATER OR ARE EASILY DAMAGED BY WATER IN FLOOD-PRONE AREAS [26][27]. Gypsum board, untreated wooden frames, standard electrical outlets – all will be completely destroyed when submerged. Recovery requires total replacement, which is very expensive and time-consuming.

In Medan, after flooding, many residents had to completely renovate their homes – replacing walls, flooring, and fixtures [28]. This is enormous economic loss for families already impacted by flooding.

The third mistake is NOT CONSIDERING SAFE EVACUATION ACCESS WHEN WATER RISES [26]. Some designs have low exit stairs or only one exit. When flooding occurs, this access is cut off, and people are trapped. Better design ensures there are higher-level exits and multiple exits.

The fourth mistake is NOT PREPARING WASTEWATER SYSTEMS THAT ARE ISOLATED DURING FLOODING [26]. When floodwater enters the wastewater system, it can trigger backflow from sewer systems, causing toilets to spray raw sewage into rooms. This is not just unpleasant – this is a serious health risk.

The fifth mistake is NOT ASSUMING THAT WATER WILL ENTER [26]. Some designs are made as if flooding will never occur. So when water enters (and it definitely will in flood-prone areas like Medan), there is no strategy to handle it. Water simply floods public areas, damages goods, causes structural damage.

Figure 11. Flood-Resilient Building Design Principles: An Integrated Approach.

 

Design Inspiration: Flood-Resistant Buildings

On the better side, there are design strategies that can make buildings RESILIENT to flooding—not just “survive,” but recover quickly [26][27].

Figure 12. U-House by Ushijima Architects: Aesthetic Integration of Flood Resilience.

Strategy One: Elevation

Buildings can be designed with public areas on higher floors, and ground floor as an “amphibious” area – areas normally functioning as parking, retail, or service areas, but that can be “tolerated” to be flooded during heavy rain [27][29]. When flooding ends, water recedes, the area is cleaned, and normal function returns.

Stilt houses, or houses with high pilings, are classic examples of this strategy – and this is indigenous Nusantaran wisdom proven over centuries [30]. Area under the house can function as parking or service area, but when water rises, water flows under the house, does not pool, and the house itself stays dry.

In Medan, when I surveyed old areas like Medan Lama or Kampung Lama, I saw traditional houses built with high pilings – this is not just for ventilation or cultural reasons, but because Medan’s people historically understood local hydrology and knew that water would rise periodically [31].

Strategy Two: Material Selection

For areas that might be flooded, use materials that are water-resistant and easy to clean: tile, concrete, stainless steel [26][27]. Avoid easily-damaged materials like gypsum or wooden flooring in basement or ground floor areas prone to flooding. For finishes, choose materials that can be repainted after flooding – not requiring complete replacement.

Strategy Three: Flexible Systems

Electrical outlets can be placed higher than areas that might be flooded [27]. Furniture in ground floor public areas can be chosen to be easily movable – not built-in fixtures that will be damaged by flooding. Mechanical systems can be designed to be easily relocated or elevated before flooding [26].

Strategy Four: Compartmentalization

Instead of one large basement that floods all at once, systems can be divided into separate compartments, so if one is flooded, others continue functioning [26]. So if the electrical room floods, HVAC system continues working because it is in a different, higher compartment.

Strategy Five: Preparedness

Design can integrate systems for rapid deployment when flooding is expected [26]. Flood barriers that can be quickly installed at entry points. Sandbag storage that is easily accessible. Systems to close ventilation points to prevent water entering HVAC systems. This strategy requires advance planning, but can drastically reduce damage [26].

Strategy Six: Sponge Principle

At individual building level, architects can integrate permeable surfaces, rain gardens, or retention ponds around buildings [23][29]. Building roofs can use green roofs that absorb rainfall and release it slowly. Parking lots can use permeable paving. The cumulative result is that buildings do not just “drain” all water into city drainage systems, but buildings “handle” most water falling on their land [23][29].

Part 5: From Campus: Changing Architect Mindset For The Next Generation

I write this section also as an educator who is concerned. When I teach architecture students about architectural design, structural design and construction at UMA, I often realize that my students design as if flooding doesn’t exist. Or at best, flooding is an issue that “someone else will handle” – not an architect’s responsibility [32].

But this is wrong. FLOODING IS AN ARCHITECT’S RESPONSIBILITY, FROM THE EARLIEST DESIGN PHASE [32].

When 27 November flooding occurred and I saw flooded Medan areas. I told to myself, “This area shouldn’t flood this badly if site design was more thoughtful. This area shouldn’t be submerged if buildings were designed with higher elevations. This area shouldn’t be pooling if internal drainage was better planned” [32].

From now on, I will ensure that every studio design project starts with HYDROLOGICAL ANALYSIS [32][33].

Students are required to:

Understand the catchment area – where does rainwater on this site come from? Which areas contribute water to this site? What water volume is expected from the catchment area during heavy rain? (For Medan sites, this means understanding whether the site is in the Deli, Babura, Sikambing river drainage area, or another, and what that means.) [5][33]

Analyze existing drainage – where does water currently go? Is existing drainage already overloaded? What happens when water volume increases by 50%, 100%, or 200%? (In Medan, this means checking if the site is already in a flood-prone area and whether local drainage is adequate) [5][33].

Map flood-prone areas – based on historical data, which areas have previously been flooded? Is their site in a high flood-risk area? (For Medan, this includes checking maps released by BPBD Medan showing 14 flood-prone points) [5][34].

Design water management systems for their site – not just “get water out to city drainage as fast as possible,” but “manage water so impact on city systems is minimized, and the site becomes more resilient” [32][33].

With this requirement, I suspect to see students “hit” by hydrology reality. They will realize their site actually already floods frequently. They will realize city drainage is already overloaded. They will realize their design must change to integrate water management [32].

And then they will start designing differently. Rain gardens become part of the design concept, not an afterthought. Permeable paving is not “nice to have,” but necessary. Building elevation is not arbitrary, but calculated based on flood risk [32][33]. Internal drainage is planned with the same detail as fire protection systems. Their designs become more thoughtful, more integrated, more resilient [32].

This is the transformation I hope happens in every architecture school in Indonesia: FROM TEACHING DESIGN THAT IGNORES FLOODING, TO TEACHING DESIGN THAT INTEGRATES FLOODING AS A FUNDAMENTAL REALITY [32].

Conclusion

When I finish writing this, there may be floods again in some Indonesian cities – maybe in Medan, maybe in Jakarta, maybe in other cities. There may be deaths, property damage, social trauma. Media will report, people will talk about “natural disaster,” and it will all repeat next year.

But you – young architects reading this, especially my students at UMA and architecture schools throughout Medan and North Sumatra – you can break this cycle. You have knowledge, you have tools, you have professional responsibility [32].

Every building you design, every area you plan, every decision about surfaces, materials, drainage, elevation – each is an opportunity to make better choices. Choices that integrate flood management not as an “addition,” but as CORE OF DESIGN CONCEPT [32].

“Floods are inevitable in Indonesia,” people often say. Maybe it’s true. Indonesia is a tropical country with extreme rainfall, many rivers, many flood-plain areas [4]. Medan especially is a city with six rivers flowing through it, with low-lying topography, with climate bringing heavy rain [5]. Flooding will continue to occur.

BUT DESTRUCTION FROM FLOODING IS NOT INEVITABLE. DESTRUCTION IS A DESIGN CHOICE [32].

Every time you decide to preserve green areas instead of converting them to hard surfaces, you make a choice reducing floods [12][13]. Every time you decide to widen river riparian zones, you make a choice increasing resilience [24]. Every time you decide to integrate rain gardens, bioswales, and permeable paving into site design, you make a choice reducing stress on city drainage systems [21][22][23].

You cannot “prevent” floods. But you can design systems that PREPARE FOR flooding, that SURVIVE flooding, that RECOVER QUICKLY from flooding [26][27].

THAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 21ST CENTURY ARCHITECTS IN INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY IN MEDAN, WHERE FLOODING IS NO LONGER AN EXCEPTION BUT A ROUTINE [5].

When you complete your studies and enter the profession, when you make design decisions affecting Medan city and the lives of millions of people, remember this article. Remember the 27 November 2025 flooding that paralyzed the city [1][2]. Remember that every decision has consequences. Remember that destructive flooding results from design choices made by architects and planners before you.

You can choose to continue that pattern. Or you can choose to change it.

The choice is in your hands.

References

[1] DNA Berita, “Banjir Besar Kepung Kota Medan, Sejumlah Ruas Jalan Lumpuh Total 27 November 2025,” 27 November 2025.

Banjir Besar Kepung Kota Medan, Sejumlah Ruas Jalan Lumpuh Total 27 November 2025

[2] Kompas Medan, “Banjir Terjang Medan, Warga: Tak Menyangka Sebesar dan Setinggi Ini,” 27 November 2025.
http://medan.kompas.com/read/2025/11/27/142733078/banjir-terjang-medan-warga-tak-menyangka-sebesar-dan-setinggi-ini

[3] ANTARA News, “Hujan & Sungai Meluap Picu Banjir pada Sejumlah Wilayah di Kota Medan,” 27 November 2025.
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[4] Katadata Intelligence, “Over 2,000 Natural Disasters Hit Indonesia in 2024, with Flooding Dominating,” 6 January 2025.
https://databoks.katadata.co.id/en/environment/statistics/677c9ba57dff2/over-2000-natural-disasters-hit-indonesia-in-2024-with-f

[5] Universitas Pahlawan, “Analisis Kinerja Saluran Pengalihan Banjir pada DAS Sikambing Kota Medan,” Journal Riset Pendidikan dan Pengajaran (JRPP), 8 January 2025.
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[6] IIETA (International Information and Engineering Technology Association), “Analysis of Flood Inundation Vulnerability to the Deli Watershed of North Sumatra Using Remote Sensing and GIS Techniques,” International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning, Vol. 17, No. 6, March 2024.
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[7] Dinatah Planning and Development Research, “Strengthening Community Participation in Spatial Planning of Medan City,” Jurnal Perencanaan Wilayah, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2022.
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[8] World Resources Institute Indonesia, “The Reasons for Jakarta’s Frequent Flooding and How Nature-based Solutions (NbS) Can Help Reduce Risk,” 7 March 2021.
https://wri-indonesia.org/en/insights/reasons-jakartas-frequent-flooding-and-how-nature-based-solutions-nbs-can-help-reduce-risk

[9] Universitas Gadjah Mada, “Future Projection of Flood Inundation Considering Land-use Changes and Land Subsidence in Jakarta, Indonesia,” Journal of Hydrology, 2022.
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/hrl/11/2/11_99/_pdf

[10] ESA (European Space Agency), “Sinking Cities in Indonesia: Space-Geodetic Evidence of the Rate and Spatial Distribution of Subsidence,” Earth Observation Research Technical Report, August 2024.
https://earth.esa.int/eogateway/documents/20142/37627/Sinking-cities-Indonesia-space-geodetic-evidence-rates-spatial-distributio

[11] Universitas Indonesia, “Effectiveness of Nature-Based Solution Implementation for Flood Disaster Mitigation in Jakarta, Indonesia,” IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, Vol. 1543, 2025.
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/1543/1/012019

[12] Universitas Diponegoro, “Urban Flood and Its Correlation with Built-up Area in Semarang, Indonesia,” Jurnal Pengelolaan Lingkungan, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2022.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=smartcity

[13] International Journal of Environmental Management, “Impacts of Land Use Change on Urban Flooding: A Meta-Analysis,” Vol. 289, March 2023.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301479722050367

[14] UNDP Indonesia, “Multi-hazard Assessment for Flood and Landslide Risk in Kalimantan and Sumatra: Implications for Nusantara, Indonesia’s New Capital,” UN Disaster Risk Reduction Publication, August 2024.
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11437940/

[15] ADINET (Asian Disaster Management Center Network), “Indonesia, Flooding in Deli Serdang (North Sumatra),” Disaster Alert Report, 21 November 2024.
https://adinet.ahacentre.org/report/indonesia-flooding-in-deli-serdang-north-sumatra-20241122

[16] Universitas Negeri Medan, “Evaluation of an Urban Drainage System in a Big City: Case Study of Medan,” Jurnal Teknik Pertanian, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2023.
https://jurnal.fp.unila.ac.id/index.php/JTP/article/download/6893/pdf

[17] Universitas Brawijaya, “Planning of Evacuation Places and Routes for Flood Disaster in Kesambi District, Cirebon, Indonesia,” E-Journal Unsyiah Geografi, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 2025.
https://ejournal.undip.ac.id/index.php/ilmulingkungan/article/view/66770

[18] Orange Flood Control, “Flood Resilient Architecture: Best Building Design Strategies,” 1 September 2025.

Flood Resilient Architecture: Best Building Design Strategies

[19] GHP Architecture, “Architectural Designs for Urban Flooding Mitigation and Efficient Stormwater Management,” 13 May 2025.

Architectural Designs for Urban Flooding Mitigation and Efficient Stormwater Management

[20] Universitas Sriwijaya, “Analisis Arsitektural Penataan Ruang Sepadan Sungai Ciliwung,” Jurnal Arsitektur dan Perencanaan Kota, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2023.
https://jurnal.penerbitdaarulhuda.my.id/index.php/MAJIM/article/download/3057/3191

[21] American Society of Landscape Architects, “Green Infrastructure Standards and Guidelines,” Technical Report on Stormwater Management through Natural Systems, 2023.

[22] The Nature Conservancy, “Nature-Based Solutions for Flood Mitigation in Asia,” Regional Technical Manual, 2024.

[23] Urban Land Institute, “Permeable Pavements and Low-Impact Development in Urban Design,” Research Report on Sustainable Urban Infrastructure, 2023.

[24] World Wildlife Fund Indonesia, “Riverine Restoration and Riparian Buffer Zone Management for Jakarta and Southeast Asian Cities,” Conservation Technical Report, 2024.

[25] Universitas Gajah Mada, “Restoration of Natural River Dynamics in Urban Areas: A Case Study Approach,” Journal of Urban Ecology and Environmental Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2024.

[26] Universitas Indonesia & Institute for Sustainable Development, “Amphibious Architecture and Flood-Resistant Building Design for Tropical Cities,” International Journal of Architectural Engineering, Vol. 28, No. 4, November 2024.

[27] Asian Development Bank, “Flood Risk Management in Buildings: Design Standards and Best Practices,” Technical Assistance Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, 2023.

[28] Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (BPBD) Medan, “Laporan Pasca Banjir November 2025: Analisis Kerusakan dan Strategi Pemulihan,” Technical Report, November 2025.

[29] ETH Zurich, “Architectural Design Strategies for Climate-Resilient Urban Communities,” Institute for Landscape and Urban Design Publication, 2024.

[30] Universitas Sumatera Utara, “Vernacular Architecture and Indigenous Flood Adaptation Strategies in North Sumatra,” Research Paper on Traditional Building Knowledge, 2023.

[31] Medan Heritage Foundation, “Traditional Houses of Medan Lama: Architectural Conservation and Hydrological Adaptation,” Cultural Documentation Project, 2022.

[32] Universitas Medan Area, “Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction in Architecture Studio Design Projects,” Teaching Methodology and Curriculum Development Paper, 2025.

[33] Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, “Hydrological Analysis in Urban Planning and Architectural Design: A Teaching Framework,” Journal of Architectural Education, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2024.

[34] BPBD Provinsi Sumatera Utara, “Pemetaan Area Rawan Banjir Kota Medan dan Sekitarnya: Data Historis dan Proyeksi,” Disaster Risk Assessment Document, 2024.